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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
desire to assist "white" orphans subordinate to a general desire to
help indigent orphans regardless of race.33
It is submitted that, of the two available alternatives, selection of
the one deleting the word "white" from the will and retaining the
present trustee as administrator of the college would be the better
choice. First of all, there is language in the testator's will that easily
could be interpreted as expressing a general intent to educate poor
people, irrespective of their race or color,34 thus making the doctrine
of cy pres available to the court.35 Further, given the changing politi-
cal and social conditions realized under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 86 there is some reason to suppose that deletion of
"white" from the will would not be contra7j to the intent of the
testator.37 Finally, since administration of the college can no longer
lawfully continue as in the past, there is much reason to believe that
the primary intent of the testator would be to keep the school operat-
ing, free from further obstructions, as nearly in accordance with the
previous mode of operation as possible.38
CRIMINAL LAW: PROOF OF INTENT UNDER BURGLARY TOOL STATUTES
Benton v. United States, 282 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
Following a search of defendant's car which yielded a burlap bag
containing an axe, a sledge hammer, a chisel, a brace and bit, a hack-
saw and four blades, twenty-five feet of rope, and two wrecking bars,
defendant was convicted of possessing implements which "may rea-
sonably be employed in the commission of any crime."1 The pertinent
part of the applicable statute provides that "no one shall have in his
possession in the District any instrument, tool or other implement for
picking locks or pockets, or that is usually employed or reasonably
33. See note 27 supra.
34. "I have been for a long time impressed with the importance of educating
the poor, and of placing them, by the early cultivation of their minds and the
development of their moral principles, above the many temptations, to which,
through poverty and ignorance they are exposed .... I have sincerely at heart
the welfare of the city of Philadelphia . . . ." Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43
U.S. 127, 129 (1884). See also Attorney-General v. Price, [1912] 1 Ch. 667
(C.A.). But see Craft v. Shroyer, 81 Ohio App. 253, 74 N.E.2d 589 (1947).
35. But see 386 Pa. at 569, 127 A.2d at 297.
36. The Thirteenth Amendment was ratified in 1865 and the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, respectively thirty-five and thirty-eight years after the
testator's will was drawn.
37. There is reason to believe that a man of such philanthropy and truly
human generosity as was Stephen Girard, who devoted almost his entire fortune
to promoting public works and alleviating human suffering, would place himself
beyond any barriers of color. See 386 Pa. at 617-18, 127 A.2d at 319-20 (dissent-
ing opinion). See also note 34 supra. But see 386 Pa. at 577-78, 127 A.2d at 300-
01 (concurring opinion).
38. See 386 Pa. at 568, 127 A.2d at 296.
1. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 22-3601 (Supp. 1951).
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may be employed in the commission of any crime, if he is unable to
satisfactorily account for the possession of such implement..."12 The
court of appeals, in upsetting the conviction, held: that although not
specifically mentioned in the statute, felonious intent was an essential
element of the crime; that the statute raised a presumption of such
intent where one merely possessed tools "which may be employed in
the commission of any crime"; and that the statute was therefore
unconstitutional when applied to possession of tools which do not in
themselves give rise to sinister implications because there was no ra-
tional connection between the possession of such tools and the intent
presumed.'
The court's interpretation of the statute as requiring felonious in-
tent iaises the question of the character and quantum of evidence
that the state must adduce to prove that intent under the burglary
tool statutes of the various jurisdictions.4 Generally these statutes can
be separated into four categories: (1) those that expressly require
proof of intent; (2) those that require proof of circumstances which
"evince" intent; (3) those that require circumstances from which
intent can be presumed or inferred; and (4) those which make no
reference to intent.
The vast majority of states have statutes which come within the
first category2 Statutes of this type declare that possession of certain
designated tools, accompanied by the requisite intent, constitutes a
substantive crime. Thus the state must prove felonious intent just as
it must prove any other element of the crime/ i.e., beyond a reason-
-2. I/n.
4, Benton v. United States, 232 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
4. All the states except Delaware, Maine, Texas and West Virginia have
burglary tool statutes of some kind, although some states classify them under
ifferent headings. Thus the burglary tool statute of New Jersey is classified
under "Disorderly Persons," the burglary tool statute of Louisiana is classified
under "Illegal Carrying of Weapons," and the burglary tool statute of Kansas
is classified under "Explosives."
5, AL'. CoD ANN. tit. 11, § 90 (1940); ARiz. Rls. STAT. ANN. e 2, § 13-304
(1956); CAL. CODE ANN. P.C. § 466 (Deering 1949); COLO. REv. STAT. c. 40, § 8(1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. c. 419, §§ 8408-09 (1949); YL& STA. ANN. tit 44, 4
810-66 (1941); GA. CODE ANN. c. 26, § 2701 (1935); IDAHO CODE AN. m. 14, §
18-1406 (11955); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 87 (1954); KY. REv. STAT. § 433.130(1953); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 95 (1950); MAss. ANN. LAws c 2K6, § 49(195.1); MICH. STAT. ANN. c. 286, § 28.311 (1938); MONT. REV. Con tit. 94, §
94-908 (1953); NEB. REv. STAT. art. 5, § 28-534 (1950); N.H. REV. SnrT. ANN.
c. 583, § 583.12 (1955); NJ. REV. STAT. tit. 2, § 2:202-7 (1939); N.C. GEN.STAT. e. 14, § 14-35 (1950); N.T. REv. CoDE § 12-3503 (1943); OIo RV. Cons
tit. 29, § 2907.111 (Baldwin 1956); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1437 (937) ; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4904 (Purdon 1939); P.R. ANN. LAws tit. 33, § 1621(19 54j; R.I. GEN. LAws c. 608, § 8 (1938); TENN. CODs ANN. c. 9, § 89-908(1956); UTAH CODE ANN. c. 9, § 76-98 (1953); VT. Rnv. STAT e. 363, § 8303(1947); Wis. STAT. ANN. c. 343, § 343-131 (1957); Wyo. Comp. STAr. ANN. §
9-312 (1945).
6. Under statutes of the first category, the elements of the crime are: (1)
suitability of the tools for brea and enterig (2) possession of the tools with
knowledge of their character; af (3) intent. eople v. Taylor, 410 1!, 469, 102
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able doubt.7 It is not necessary for the state to show that the defen-
dant specifically intended to use the tools for committing a particular
burglary.8 It need only prove that the defendant had the tools in his
possession with a general intent to commit a burglary., That such a
general intent can be proved with greater facility than the intent to
commit a specific burglary is manifest.10
The statutes which fall into the second category,1 while also re-
quiring intent by their terms, take the nature of the evidence neces-
sary to prove intent out of the realm of conjecture. Thus, what is
implicit in statutes of the first category is actually spelled out in
statutes of the second category: the circumstances surrounding the
possession of the tools must allow the intent to commit a burglary to
be reasonably inferred. 2
The third category, 3 into which the principal case falls, 4 while
N.E.2d 529 (1951); People v. Dorrington, 221 Mich. 571, 191 N.W. 831 (1923).
See also 30 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 278 (1952). It should be noted that the tools
need not be designed and manufactured specifically to be used in a burglary. If
the tools are suitable for the purpose, the first element of the crime is satisfied,
even though they can also be used for innocent purposes. State v. Widenski, 50
R.I. 148, 146 At. 407 (1929) ; Commonwealth v. Riley, 192 Ky. 153, 232 S.W. 630(1921); Commonwealth v. Tivnon, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 375 (1857).
7. State v. Salernitano, 27 N.J. Super. 537, 99 A.2d 820 (App. Div. 1953). See
also 20 Ai. Jun., Evidence § 149 (1939); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 318 (1954); 9
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940), where the author points out that there
is some difference of opinion among the courts whether the state must prove each
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, or only the whole issue. For a
discussion of the history and meaning of "reasonable doubt" see 9 id. § 2497; and
MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra at § 321.
8. Commonwealth v. Tivnon, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 375, 380 (1857).
9. Commonwealth v. Dionisio, 178 Pa. Super. 330, 116 A.2d 109 (1955) ; People
v. Taylor, 410 Ill. 469, 102 N.E.2d 529 (1951) ; Commonwealth v. Tivnon, 74 Mass.(8 Gray) 375 (1857). See also 30 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 278 (1952); 12 C.J.S.,
Burglary § 69 (1938).
10. The cases are uniform in holding that circumstantial evidence can be used
to prove the necessary intent. This comment is directed towards the question:
what kind of circumstances must the state prove in order to make its case?
Courts have held that in proving the general intent necessary under statutes
of the first category, the state will be permitted to show: that the defendant is a
burglar, that he was in haste to leave town, and gave different points of destina-
tion, People v. Jefferson, 161 Mich. 621, 126 N.W. 829 (1910); that he had the
tools secreted in his clothing, People v. Donovan, 216 Mich. 231, 184 N.W. 863(1921) ; that he was associating with burglars at the time of his arrest, Brown
v. State, 32 Ohio Cir. Ct. 93 (1910) ; that he had other tools in his possession
which, when viewed in connection with the tools, the possession of which formed
the gravamen of the crime, indicated that he had the intent to commit a bur-
glary, State v. Widenski, 50 R.I. 148, 146 Atl. 407 (1929) (flashlight), State v.
Salernitano, 27 N.J. Super. 537, 99 A.2d 820 (App. Div. 1953) (gloves and flash-
lights).
11. MINN. STAT. ANN. c. 621, § 621.13 (1945); N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 40, § 40-9-8(1953); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 408; S.C. CODE c. 5, § 16-302 (Supp. 1952); WASH.
REV. CODE tit. 14, § 2582 (1953).
12. State v. Pulley, 216 S.C. 552, 59 S.E.2d 155 (1950).
13. IND. ANN. STAT. C. 7, § 10-703 (Burns 1956); IOwA CODE ANN. tit. 35, §
708-7 (1950); MD. CODE ANN. § 576 (Flack 1951); Miss. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
2046 (1942); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.080; S.D. CODE § 13-3707 (1939); VA. CODE
§ 18-159 (1950).
14. The court construed that part of the statute which required the possessor
of the tools to "satisfactorily account" for them (see text at note 2 supra) as
raising the forbidden presumption.
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also requiring intent, purports to alleviate the state's burden of proof.
Under these statutes the necessary intent is presumed upon a showing
by the state that the defendant possessed "burglary tools."'0 The ac-
cepted yardstick for measuring the constitutionality of such statutory
presumptions is the "rational connection test"' which was first enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in Mobile, J.K.R.R. v. Turnipseed.'1 The
rational connection test requires that there be some rational relation-
ship-in common experience-between the fact proved and the fact
presumed. Due process is violated under the test whenever a criminal
statute presumes guilty intent from wholly innocuous circumstances."s
For example, category three statutes will be upheld against a consti-
tutional challenge only if there is a rational connection between the
possession of certain tools and the presumption that the defendant
intended to use them to commit a burglary. The distinction between
the first two categories and this one is that in the first two, the state
must adduce evidence to prove felonious intent, while in the third, in
order to satisfy the rational connection test, the state must prove
that the tools which the defendant had in his possession might in
common experience be designated as "burglary tools."
Only three states, Missouri," Arkansas, 20 and Kansas 21 have stat-
utes which fall into the last category. Although the Missouri and
Arkansas statutes are worded almost exactly alike,22 the courts of
15. The effect of a presumption in a criminal case, that is, whether it author-
izes a directed verdict of guilty, is beyond the scope of this comment. The trial
court in the principal case submitted the issues to the jury. The "general trend"
und,-r the "stolen goods" statutes, which are closely analogous to the burglary
tool statutes, is to hold that the presumption merely authorizes the court to send
the case to the jury and the jury to convict. See 9 WIGINIORE, op. Cit. supra note 7,
at 2,- 1:. For a general discussion of presumptions and their effects, see 9 id.
S2.185-93; McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 7, at c. 36.
16. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Morrison v. California, 291
U.S. 32 (19:34); McFarland v. American Sugar Refinery Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916).
17. 219 U.S. :35 (1910). The Court, speaking through Justice Lurton, said:
"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not
constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of equal protection of the
law it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one from
yroof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary man-
(late." 14. at 43.
18. The rational connection test has not met with the universal approval of
legal scholars. For a history and discussion of the'test, and a comparison be-
tveen it and other tests used to determine the constitutionality of statutory
presumptions, see MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 313. See also Bros-
man, ThK Statutory Presunmption, 5 Tu,. L. Rm,. 17, 178 (1930) ; Keeton,
Statatroi Presunmptions-Their Constitutionality and Their Legal Effect, 10
TEVAS L. REv. 34 (1931); Comment, 38 MiCH. L. REV. 366 (1940).
19. Mo. REV. STAT. § 560.115 (1949).
20. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1006 (1947).
21. The Kansas statute requires only that the "instrument or mechanical de-
vice" be "designed or commonly used" for breaking and entering. KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. art. 24, § 21-2437 (1949). Although the statute has been in effect at
least since 1923, no cases decided under it have been found and it is therefore
disregarded in the following analysis.
22. The Arkansas statute reads as follows:
41-1006-Possess ion or manufacture of burglar's tools. Any person who
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss3/5
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these states have reached diametrically opposite results. The Supreme
Court of Missouri has construed its statute to make intent an es-
sential element of the crime. 23 Thus by interpretation the court placed
the statute in category one, with its attendant requirements regarding
proof of intent. The Supreme Court of Arkansas, on the other hand,
has held that under its statute proof of mere possession of "burglary
tools" is enough to sustain a conviction.2 4 The Arkansas courts, have,
however, recognized that many tools can be used innocently as well
as to commit a burglary, and have declared that if the statute is con-
strued to make mere possession of "common, ordinary, every-day
work tools" a felony, the statute would be unconstitutional.2r How-
ever, if the combination of the tools in the defendant's possession, or
the circumstances surrounding their possession would permit a jury
makes, mends, designs or sets up, or who has in his custody or concealed
about his person, any tool, false key, lockpick, bit, nippers, fuse. force
screw, punch, drill, jimmy, bit, or any material, implement or other me-
chanical device whatsoever, adapted, designed or commonly used for break-
ing into any vault, safe, railroad car, boat, vessel, warehouse, store, shop,
office, dwelling house, or door, shutter, or window of a building of any kind.
shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than two (2) years, nor
more than ten (10) years.
The Missouri statute reads as follows:
§ 560.115-Any person who makes, mends, designs or sets up, or who has in
his custody or concealed about his person any tool, false key, lock pick,
bit, nippers, fuse, force screw, punch, drill, jimmy, bit, or any material,
implement, instrument, or other mechanical device, whatsoever, adapted,
designed, or commonly used for breaking into any vault, safe, railroad car.
boat, vessel, warehouse, store, shop, office, dwelling house, or door, shutter,
or window of a building of any kind, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon
conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary
for not less than two years, nor more than ten years. (Emphasis added.)
Note that the word "instrument" in the Missouri statute is not present in the
Arkansas statute. This is the only difference between the two.
23. State v. Hefflin, 338 Mo. 336, 89 S.W.2d 938 (1935). See also State v.
Lorts, 269 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. 1954).
24. Cascio v. State, 213 Ark. 418, 210 S.W.2d 897 (1948); Prather v. State,
191 Ark. 903, 88 S.W.2d 851 (1935); Satterfield v. State, 174 Ark. 733, 296 S.W.
63 (1927). Indictment under the statute need not allege intent. Jones v. State,
181 Ark. 336, 25 S.W.2d 752 (1930).
25. The courtin Satterfield v. State, 174 Ark. 733, 296 S.W. 63 (1927) said:
This statute was passed in 1915, and has never before been before this court
for construction. It is notable that the statute does not require an intent to
commit the crime of burglary to make the possession of such tools or imple-
ments unlawful. The bare possession thereof, without anything more, is
made a felony. In this respect it is unlike the statutes of some of the other
states. This being a criminal statute, it must be strictly construed .... And
the construction must be strict as against the defendant but liberal in his
favor.... But this rule of strict construction must be applied with other
rules of construction in mind so as not to work an absurdity or to defeat the
intent of the legislature .... We must attribute to the legislature, in enacting
the above statute, the intention to accomplish a useful and laudable purpose,
that of eliminating the crime of burglarly as far as possible, by making it
unlawful to make, mend, design, set up or have in possession burglar tools,
such tools as are peculiarly and fittingly "adapted, designed, or commonly
used for breaking into any vault [etc.] . . ." We can not attribute to the
legislature the intention to prohibit the making, mending or designing, set-
ting up or having in possession of the common, ordinary, everyday work
Washington University Open Scholarship
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reasonably to believe that they are in fact "burglary tools," then the
mere possession of them would be enough to sustain a conviction.26
It is submitted that the state must introduce the same character
and quantum of evidence in all four categories, although for different
purposes. In the first two categories by the terms of the statutes, and
in Missouri by judicial interpretation, the state must prove felonious
intent, and it does this by showing that the circumstances under
which the defendant had the tools in his possession would allow a jury
reasonably to believe that the defendant intended to commit a bur-
glary. In the third category the state must show that the tools found
in the defendant's possession were in fact "burglar's tools," that is,
that the intent may be presumed from them without contravening the
requirements of the rational connection test. It strains the imagina-
tion to conceive of any tool which can be used exclusively for commit-
ing burglaries.-" Therefore, the only way in which the state can meet
the requirements of the rational connection test is to show that the
combination of tools in the defendant's possession, or the circum-
stances under which they were found in his possession, would justify
classifying them as "burglar's tools"' ' in common experience.
Finally, although the Arkansas court has interpreted its statute
as not requiring the state to show felonious intent, the state must,
nevertheless, adduce evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which
totls of a mechanic, plumber, carpenter, farmer, or other person who may
i equiie such tools in his business, trade, or profession. If so it would be un-
,',nstitationwd and void. The tools mentioned, including the particular enu-
nieration of tools (and every tool mentioned may be had for a lawful pur-
pose), must be such as are "adapted, designed, or commonly used by bur-
glars." (Emphasis added.)
26. Cascio v. State, 213 Ark. 418, 210 S.W.2d 897, 898 (1948); Prather v.
State, 191 Ark. 903, 88 S.W.2d 851, 852 (1935).
27. Mahar v. Lainson, 247 Iowa 297, 72 N.W.2d 516 (1955); Prather v. State,
191 Ark. 903, 88 S.W.2d 851 (1935); State v. Erdlen, 127 Iowa 620, 103 N.W. 984
(1904). The court in the Erdlen case said:
The statute does not, however, undertake to define what tools come within
the meaning of the term as used. And, turning away from the statute, we
cannot say that any particular tool or set of tools is so generally and ex-
clusively known as burglar's tools that the common mind must needs picture
the same upon the bare utterance of the expression, and without further de-
scription. Quite to the contrary, it is undoubtedly true that any one of
possible thousands of tools may be used by a burglar in the prosecution of
his marauding expeditions. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive that there can
be any tools made use of by burglars-from the bungler to the expert-
which may not also have a place in the uses of legitimate industry.
Id. at 621, 103 N.W. at 985.
The court in the principal case, however, indicated that certain implements give
ise to sinister implications per se, citing "lottery tickets" and "opium" as ex-
amples. That neither of these is a burglary tool is patent. It is submitted that
the rule of the Erdlen case is the correct one.
28. It is apparent that if the view of State v. Erdlen, supra note 27, is ac-
cepted, and the decision of the court in the principal case is interpreted as re-
stricting the presumption to tools which in themselves give rise to sinister impli-
cations, without any extrinsic evidence to show that the circumstances make
them sinister, no such presumption could ever be valid.
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the jury might reasonably believe that the tools were in fact "bur-
glar's tools" within the purview of the statute. It is submitted, there-
fore, that as a practical matter, the variations in wording'and inter-
pretation of the burglary statutes of the several states are really dis-
tinctions without a difference.
TORTS: THE REMEDY OF A PERSON DEFAMED ON RADIO OR TELEVISION
AGAINST HIS DEFAMER-A CRITIQUE
Basic to the Anglo-American legal system is the premise that the
common law is a flexible instrument of justice, capable of developing
to meet the needs of a society living in conditions completely different
from, and entirely unanticipated by, the society in which the law
originated.1 The capacity of the common law to grow has been seri-
ously challenged in recent years by the inventions of radio and tele-
vision and the appearance of broadcast 2 defamation cases. Whether
the common law affords the person defamed on a broadcast a remedy
against his defamer is a question which the courts have found espe-
cially difficult to answer.3 The causes of this difficulty lie in peculiar-
ities of the common law which date from 1812, when the division of
defamation into the torts of libel and slander was definitely settled
by Thorley v. Lord Kerry.4 At that time it was believed that the
distinction between the torts was a purely formal one: libel was
written, slander was oral, defamation.5 Libel, however, carried the
more serious consequences. The plaintiff in a libel suit recovered upon
showing he had been defamed, without proving damage.0 In slander,
on the other hand, unless the offensive words fit into one of several
narrow categories known as "slander per se,' 7 plaintiff was required
to prove special damage., Special damage was restricted to actual
pecuniary loss, pleaded in detail and proved precisely as pleaded.
1. See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354-55, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694, 27 A.L.R.2d
1250 (1951).
2. Throughout this comment, the word "broadcast" is used to denote radio and
television cases collectively.
3. This comment deals primarily with this problem. The equally intriguing
question of the liability of the broadcasting station is not considered except as
it illuminates the main issue.
4. 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812).
5. PRoSSER, TORTS § 93 (2d ed. 1955) (hereafter cited PROSSER).
6. Ibid.; 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 5.9 (1956) ; 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 569
(1938) (hereafter cited RESTATEMENT).
7. The categories were: imputations of serious crimes; imputations of certain
loathsome diseases; imputations affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, pro-
fession or office; and, in some jurisdictions, imputations of unchastity to women.
PROSSER § 93.
8. Ibid.; RESTATEMENT § 575.
9. McCoRRmic, DAMAGES §§ 114-15 (1935).
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